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ADDENDA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff'Appellee, 
v. 
ROY DEAN TAYLOR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANT NOT IN CUSTODY 
Case # 20040908-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Commitment in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, Duchesne Division, for conviction by way of a guilty plea and sentence for one count of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne 
presiding, on October 18, 2004. 
This Court obtains jurisdiction to review the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: 
Did the trial Court err when it first allowed the taking of the guilty plea and then failed to 
allow Mr. Taylor to withdraw the plea? 
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Mr. Taylor asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective in her representation of him at the 
time of the plea and sentence in that she failed to interview his witnesses, failed to investigate his 
case to determine if he had a valid defense and failed to stop the plea proceedings when it was 
clear that he was not comfortable in taking the plea. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel 
"rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment' and that counsel's performance prejudiced'" the defendant. State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 
376 (Utah 1999), citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
In the event that this Court does not find ineffective assistance of counsel in the actions or 
inactions of defense counsel, Mr. Taylor asserts that the Trial Court committed plain error when it 
failed to see that he was not admitting to criminal misconduct in possessing the knife and the plea 
was inappropriate. 
This Court may address an issue if it was not raised below by counsel under the Plain 
Error standard. "To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (I) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.'" . quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
SECOND ISSUE: 
Mr. Taylor asserts that after his plea was accepted, his sentence was immediately imposed 
and he was not given any time to discuss the matter with counsel. It does not show that he 
waived his minimum time for sentencing on the record. His sentence was imposed without 
information being presented as to his very ill uncle that he cared for, his wife's mental health 
status or other pertinent and mitigating circumstances. 
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Here Mr. Taylor would again raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as to the 
issues of the premature sentence without mitigation being presented. 
Where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised for the first time on appeal they 
are reviewed as a matter of law. See Maestas, Id. 
This Court has ruled that a sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court 
has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah Ct.App. 1993); State 
v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In relation to sentence issues this Court has held that imposition of a sentence is within the 
discretion of the trial court. See Schweitzer, at 651. " We will reverse only if the sentence was 
imposed without regard to "legally relevant factors" or in an "inherently unfair" manner, or if the 
sentence was "clearly excessive" or exceeded the "limits prescribed by law." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and 
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Roy Dean Taylor was cited on September 1, 2004 for a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §76-10-503, Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person (Docket Entry 
#1). Mr. Taylor bonded out of jail (Docket Entry #3) and the case was set for arraignment 
(Docket Entry #4). 
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The arresting officer alleged in his "Fact Sheet" that on September 1, 2004 that Mr. 
Taylor was stopped in a truck where Mr. Taylor was a passenger. In the truck on the dash board 
was a knife with a 5 to 6 inch blade and that Mr. Taylor admitted the knife belonged to him 
(Docket Entry #5). 
On September 2, 2004 a formal Information was filed by the Duchesne County Attorney 
alleging that Mr. Taylor had possession of a dangerous weapon and that he was a restricted 
person (Docket Entry #6). 
Mr. Taylor was determined to be indigent and trial counsel was appointed to represent him 
(Docket Entry #10-12). A bench trial was scheduled to take place before the honorable Judge A. 
Lynn Payne on October 18, 2004, however Mr. Taylor entered a plea of guilty to the charge 
(Docket Entry #19). 
A plea colloquy was taken and the trial Court reviewed rights with Mr. Taylor (Docket 
Entry #19) and Mr. Taylor entered a plea of guilty to the charge (Docket Entry # 19). 
Mr. Taylor then provided a factual basis for the plea and it was provided to the Court that Mr. 
Taylor was acting under a mistake of law or fact (Docket Entry # 20). 
Mr. Taylor was sentenced to one year in jail, probation thereafter for three years, an 
$800.00 fine which included the surcharge and other standard conditions. The Court specifically 
stated that the jail sentence for this case was to run concurrent with a jail sentence on the prior 
case in which probation was violated due to the conviction (Docket Entry #21). 
On October 19, 2004 Mr. Taylor filed a request to withdraw his plea of guilty which was 
denied (Docket Entry #24) and a Notice of Appeal on October 21, 2004 (Docket Entry #33-34). 
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On November 23, 2004 appellate counsel filed a Motion to Stay Imposition of Sentence as 
requested by Mr. Taylor (Docket Entry # 49-51) which was denied. Appellate counsel now files 
this appeal based upon the written requests of Mr. Taylor as to the issues he wanted raised 
regarding his plea and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The arresting officer alleged in his "Fact Sheet" that on September 1, 2004 that Deputy 
Monty Nay and he were patrolling SR35 in Duchesne County, State of Utah, when they stopped a 
red ford F150 truck for speeding and not having any visual license plate. The officers alleged that 
Mr. Rodney Nielsen, the driver of the truck, was traveling 68 MPH in a 55MPH speed zone 
(Docket Entry #5). 
The officers approached the vehicle to talk to the occupants, Roy Dean Taylor and 
Michael Lockwood were passengers in the truck. The officers saw a knife with a 5 to 6 inch 
blade sitting on the dashboard in front of Roy Taylor (Docket Entry #5). 
The officers were familiar with Mr. Taylor and knew that he had prior felony convictions 
and that he was a Category II Restricted Person and could not have a weapon. The officers allege 
that Mr. Taylor admitted the knife was his and had the sheath to it on his belt (Docket Entry #5). 
At the time of the plea Mr. Taylor stated, "Well, your Honor, I was released from parole. 
And I kind of misunderstood what happened then, because I thought that after I was off parole I 
was allowed to go ahead and carry it, you know, as long as it was for work purposes. And that's 
where I was headed the day I was arrested." (Transcript of Hearing, Page 7-8). 
The Court asked Mr. Taylor if "...it was something you had control of?" Mr. Taylor 
answered, " Well, it was on the dashboard of the truck." Mr. Taylor stated that he knew he could 
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not carry the knife on the street but it was something he used for work in construction and that he 
had the other occupant in the truck hold the knife until they got to the job site. The other 
occupant of the truck put the knife up on the dashboard. 
The Court stated, " I'm having a hard time thinking right now whether or not that would 
be a defense, that he had a misunderstanding about what the law was. But have you examined 
that at least?" (Transcript of Hearing, Page 9). 
Defense counsel provided, "He knew that he was not supposed to possess the weapons 
unless for work. He understood at that time-the minute entry reflects you did place him on 
probation. He understood at that time he would complete his parole for the felony conviction as 
of August 2004 of this year. That date came and went. And it's his belief that he was then free to 
possess the knife for purposes of work. He did in fact make an attempt to not possess it in 
violation of your order. He had the knife in his home. He uses it for work. He gave it to his 
brother-in-law, Rodney Nielsen. Stated to Rodney, I am not permitted to carry this. I can only 
use it for work. Rodney put it on the dashboard as they were driving to Kamas to perform some 
work... construction in Kamas." (Transcript of Hearing, page 10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
FIRST ISSUE: 
Mr. Taylor asserts that his plea was not a valid plea. He asserts that he never knowingly 
and intentionally possessed the knife in question and therefore there was not sufficient evidence 
upon which to base his plea of guilty. When he tried to withdraw the plea the trial Court would 
not let him do so. 
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Mr. Taylor asserts that his trial attorney forced him to take the plea and that she did not 
properly look into a defense. He asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective in her 
representation of him at the time of the plea and sentence in that she failed to interview his 
witnesses, failed to investigate his case to determine if he had a valid defense and failed to stop the 
plea proceedings when it was clear that he was not comfortable in taking the plea. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel 
"rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment' and that counsel's performance prejudiced'" the defendant. State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 
376 (Utah 1999), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
In the event that this Court does not find ineffective assistance of counsel in the actions or 
inactions of defense counsel, Mr. Taylor asserts that the Trial Court committed plain error when it 
failed to see that he was not admitting to criminal misconduct in possessing the knife and the plea 
was inappropriate. 
As stated above, his Court may address an issue if it was not raised below by counsel 
under the Plain Error standard. "To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden 
of showing (I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful.'" . quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
SECOND ISSUE: 
Mr. Taylor asserts that after his plea was accepted, his sentence was immediately imposed 
and he was not given any time to discuss the matter with counsel. It does not show that he 
waived his minimum time for sentencing on the record. His sentence was imposed without 
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information being presented as to his very ill uncle that he cared for, his wife's mental health 
status or other pertinent and mitigating circumstances. 
Here Mr. Taylor would again raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as to the 
issues of the premature sentence without mitigation being presented. 
Where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised for the first time on appeal they 
are reviewed as a matter of law. See Maestas. Id. 
As stated above this Court has ruled that a sentence will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or 
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall 861 P.2d 454, 457 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In relation to sentence issues this Court has held that imposition of a sentence is within the 
discretion of the trial court. See Schweitzer, at 651. " We will reverse only if the sentence was 
imposed without regard to "legally relevant factors" or in an "inherently unfair" manner, or if the 
sentence was "clearly excessive" or exceeded the "limits prescribed by law." Id. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR FIRST, WHEN IT TOOK THE GUILTY PLEA OF MT. 
TAYLOR AND SECOND WHEN IT FAILED TO ALLOW HIM TO WITHDRAW THE 
PLEA. 
Under Utah Code Annotated a violation of the Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, §76-10-503 (2)(b) encompasses the mens rea required to commit a violation of the law. 
The prosecution would have to be able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Taylor 
had knowingly and intentionally possessed the knife. Mr. Taylor asserts that his mistake of the 
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law and his restricted status was a valid defense, even if it was jury nullification of the possession 
element. 
Mr. Taylor asserts that he came to trial on October 18, 2004, prepared for a bench trial. 
He brought his witnesses and that his trial attorney did not interview them, did not discuss any 
viable defense theory that could be asserted and that she forced him to take a guilty plea in the 
case. 
Although these are assertions of Mr. Taylor counsel is unable to cite to the record to 
support these assertions, counsel does provide that the plea colloquy and sentence discussion 
indicates that Mr. Taylor was confused about the status of the law, his ability to possess weapons 
after his parole was expired and his actual possession of the weapon (Transcript, pages 8-10). 
Even the trial Court was confused as to whether or not Mr. Taylor's mistake of the law, 
mistake of fact and lack of physical possession of the knife would support a factual basis for the 
plea (Transcript, pages 8-9). 
Mr. Taylor asserts that by failing to investigate his defenses, interview witnesses and 
forcing him to take the plea when he was not comfortable admitting actions he did not commit his 
trial attorney was ineffective. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
show that trial counsel "rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment' and that counsel's performance prejudiced'" the defendant. 
State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
In the event that this Court does not find ineffective assistance of counsel in the actions or 
inactions of defense counsel, Mr. Taylor asserts that the Trial Court committed plain error when it 
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failed to see that he was not admitting to criminal misconduct in possessing the knife and the plea 
was inappropriate. 
As stated above, his Court may address an issue if it was not raised below by counsel 
under the Plain Error standard. "To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden 
of showing "(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is hannfiil."1. quoting State v. Dunn, 850 R2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Mr. Taylor asserts that as his discussions with the trial Court proceeded as to his restricted 
status, his possession of the knife, the use of the knife for work and other facts that it should have 
been clear that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and had a factual basis to support the plea. 
He asks this Court to review the transcripts and the factual basis for the stop and to vacate his 
conviction and allow him to withdraw his plea. 
MR. TAYLOR ASSERTS THAT HE WAS NOT TOLD HIS SENTENCE COULD BE SET 
OUT AT LEAST TWO DAYS AND IHAT HIS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AT SENTENCING. 
Mr. Taylor was not able to present mitigating information that should have been provided 
at sentencing as he was not given sufficient time to do so. Only after sentencing was he able to 
present the information such as letters from his wife's counselor and information as to his uncle 
that was dependant on him for care (Docket entry # 45-46, 49-51). Although a Motion for 
Imposition of Stay of Sentence was filed, it was too late and the Court was not willing to stay the 
sentence (Docket Entry #55-56). 
Mr. Taylor asserts that had he been able to present the information timely, at a sentence 
hearing that the trial Court would not have sent him to jail. 
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As stated above this Court has ruled that a sentence will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or 
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. NuttalL 861 P.2d 454, 457 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993); State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In relation to sentence issues this Court has held that imposition of a sentence is within the 
discretion of the trial court. See Schweitzer, at 651. " We will reverse only if the sentence was 
imposed without regard to "legally relevant factors" or in an "inherently unfair" manner, or if the 
sentence was "clearly excessive" or exceeded the "limits prescribed by law." Id. 
Therefore, although the trial Court had the sole discretion of the sentence, Mr. Taylor 
asserts that he should have been advised on the record of the minimum and maximum time for 
sentence and been allowed to decide which he chose so that he could have provided the 
information to the court to make and informed, fair, legal sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this Court find that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his plea, that the trial Court committed plain error when it accepted such a plea and that 
the plea should have been allowed to be withdrawn. In support of his claims Mr. Taylor asserts 
the trial Court's failure to correct the plea was plain error. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor asserts his 
trial attorney was ineffective in not investigating his case, interviewing the witnesses that appeared 
in court and in forcing the plea to go forward. 
Lastly, Mr. Taylor asserts that the trial Court committed an error when it did not tell him 
he could be sentenced in not more than two but less that 45 days and that he had the right to have 
the minimum amount of time to prepare mitigating sentence information. As a result, Mr. Taylor 
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asserts that he was not able to present any of his mitigating information that was only able to be 
presented on a Motion to Stay the Imposition of Sentence. Mr. Taylor asserts that his sentence 
was therefore incorrect and that he was too harshly sentenced for his crime based on the lack of 
mitigating information. 
Mr. Taylor would therefore like to have his conviction vacated and remanded back to the 
trial court for a trial on the original charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J 5 _ day of <JU/2f^Ju 2005. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered or mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief to: 
DATED THIS f S DAY OF H ^ V / / 2005. 
STEPHEN FOOTE 
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 206 
DUCHESNE, UTAH 84021 
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P.O. Box 206 ^ 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(435) 738-0184 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
—000O000— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROY DEAN TAYLOR, 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 041800135 and 031800207 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
CRIMINAL NO. 031800207 
PURCHASE, TRANSFER, POSSESSION OR USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY 
RESTRICTED PERSON - A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 
CRIMINAL NO. 041800135 
PURCHASE, TRANSFER, POSSESSION OR USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY 
RESTRICTED PERSON - A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 
The above-entitled cases came before the Court for Sentencing on Monday, October 18, 
2004, the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne presiding. The defendant was present and was 
represented by his attorney, Marea A. Doherty. The State of Utah was represented by Stephen D. 
Foote, Deputy Duchesne County Attorney. Statements were made by counsel for the parties and 
the defendant. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
That die defendant has been convicted by his own plea of guilty in Criminal No. 
041800135 of the offense of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon 
by Restricted Person, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-10-503(2)(b) UCA 
(1953) as amended. 
That for the offense of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon 
by Restricted Person, a Class A Misdemeanor, Criminal No. 041800135. it is hereby ordered 
that the defendant is sentenced to serve a term of one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail, and to 
pay a fine in the sum of $800. Said jail sentence shall run concurrent with the jail sentence that 
the defendant is sentenced to in Criminal No. 031800207. 
Based upon the guilty plea of the defendant in Criminal No. 041800135. the Court found 
the defendant to be in violation of his probation in Criminal No. 031800207. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's probation be terminated in Criminal No* 
031800207. 
The foregoing concurrent jail sentences are suspended and the defendant is placed on 
supervised probation for a period of three (3) years in both Criminal Nos. 031800207 and 
041800135 upon the following terms and conditions: 
L The defendant shall enter into the regular agreement with Adult Probation and Parole 
and strictly abide by the conditions of the agreement. 
2. The defendant shall violate no laws. 
3. The defendant shall keep this Court and his probation officer informed of his current 
address and report to the Court whenever he is requested to do so. 
4. TTie defendant shall pay his fines and fees for both Criminal Nos. 031800209 and 
041800135 as directed by Adult Probation and Parole. 
5. The defendant shall abide by any curfew imposed by Adult Probation and Parole. Any 
exception to the curfew will be the time frame necessary for the defendant's employment, and he 
is to go directly to and from work. 
6. The defendant shall reimburse the Duchesne County Jail for his incarceration at the rate 
of $45,24 per day. Payments shall be made to the Eighth District Court, PO Box 990, Duchesne 
UT 84021. 
7. The defendant shall reimburse Duchesne County for his indigent counsel expenses in 
the sum of $250. 
8. The defendant shall serve one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail, with a review in 
90 days, Hie defendant shall report to the jail on Friday, October 22,2004, by 5:00 p,m. 
9. Defendant shall obey all the rules of the Duchesne County Jail during his period of 
incarceration, 
DATED this \ J day of eeteberr2004. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
ymmmm 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form. 
Marea A. D o h e r t y ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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